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NO. 54 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Maghrebi Rivalries Over 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Algeria and Tunisia Seeking to Keep Up with Morocco 
Isabelle Werenfels 
The Covid-19 pandemic has moved relations with Sub-Saharan Africa further up the 
Maghreb countries’ agenda and consolidated existing trends. Morocco is the Maghreb 
state with the most sophisticated Sub-Sahara policy. Its motivations include attractive 
growth markets in Africa, frustration over restricted access to Europe, stalemated in-
tegration in the Maghreb and the wish to see the Western Sahara recognised as Moroc-
can. Morocco’s Sub-Sahara policy has heightened tensions with Algeria and awakened 
ambitions in Tunisia. Algiers, as a significant funder and security actor in the African 
Union (AU) and “protector” of the Western Sahara independence movement, is seek-
ing to thwart Rabat’s advances. Tunis for its part is trying to follow in Rabat’s foot-
steps, hoping that closer relations with Africa will boost economic growth. The Euro-
pean Union should treat these trends as an opportunity for African integration and 
triangular EU/Maghreb/Sub-Sahara cooperation. This could counteract Algeria’s feel-
ing of growing irrelevance, strengthen Tunisia’s economy, put Morocco’s hegemonic 
ambitions in perspective, and thus mitigate the negative dynamics of the rivalry. 
 
The Africa policies of the Maghreb states 
differ significantly in their intensity, vis-
ibility, motivations, and priorities. On a 
broader level they reflect each state’s gen-
eral domestic and foreign policy capacities. 
This is visible not least in the way the coun-
tries market their Africa policies. 
For some time Morocco has had the most 
dynamic and progressive Africa policy of the 
three countries. King Hassan II, who ruled 
from 1961 to 1999, had already put out 
feelers to West Africa. But it is under his 
son Mohammed VI (since 1999) that Morocco 
has proactively pursued a key economic 
and diplomatic role in Africa. Mohammed 
VI took personal charge of the country’s 
Africa policy, backing it with intense travel 
diplomacy and strategic appearances, for 
example at the 5th AU-EU Summit in 2017 
in Abidjan. Rabat has achieved notable suc-
cesses with its soft power approach, which 
encompasses economic, development co-
operation, migration and religious compo-
nents. In January 2017 Morocco was re-
admitted to the AU after 33 years, against 
the objections of heavyweights like South 
Africa and Algeria but strongly supported 
by numerous West African states as well as 
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Rwanda. Morocco quit the AU’s predeces-
sor in protest in 1984 after it accepted the 
Western Sahara into membership. 
Morocco has enormously expanded its 
presence in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past 
decade, above all economically. It is one 
of the continent’s largest African investors, 
alongside South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria, 
and the biggest African investor in West 
Africa, where Moroccan insurance compa-
nies, telecommunications providers, and 
banks enjoy significant market shares. Mo-
rocco also exports agricultural and renew-
able energy technology, especially to West 
Africa, and is increasingly looking to East 
and Central Africa too, for example Ethio-
pia, Rwanda and Cameroon. Since 2017 
Rabat has also been seeking accession to 
the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), to date without success. 
One central driver of this policy is the 
desire to open up new markets for Moroc-
can businesses, especially those controlled 
by the royal family. Two relevant aspects 
here are the limited access to the European 
Single Market and marginal economic inter-
action across the closed border with Algeria. 
Morocco’s desire for recognition of its claim 
to the Western Sahara is at least as impor-
tant for its “turn to Africa”. Related to this is 
the regional rivalry with Algeria that goes 
beyond the Western Sahara question, where 
Algeria functions as the “protector” of the 
independence movement, the Polisario. 
Both states are seeking to exploit new op-
portunities created by changes in the larger 
regional context, such as the ousting of the 
Libyan leader and advocate of greater Afri-
can unity Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, who played 
an extremely active role in African diplo-
macy, development, and security questions. 
Neighbour Algeria Irritated 
Morocco’s rise on the continent could be 
described as close to traumatic for Algeria, 
whose influence has waned substantially. 
During the first decades after independence 
in 1962 Algeria enjoyed great prestige in 
large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa on account 
of its military, logistical and financial sup-
port for anti-colonial movements. Close 
development cooperation with the newly 
independent African states and significant 
engagement in the Non-Aligned Movement 
also boosted Algeria’s standing across the 
continent. 
Since its civil war in the 1990s, which 
coincided with the end of the Cold War 
order, Algiers has failed to restore its lost 
grandeur and its policy of “strategic depth” 
in Africa. The security sphere represents a 
partial exception. Here Algeria plays a rele-
vant role within the AU institutions, and 
Algiers has also engaged as a mediator in 
African conflicts with some success. Eco-
nomic initiatives under President Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika between 1999 and 2019 – such 
as an ambitious investment conference in 
Algiers at the end of 2016 – have been less 
successful. Although Algeria was a found-
ing member of the AU’s development agency 
NEPAD (now AUDA), its engagement has 
remained modest, despite having had con-
siderable material resources at its disposal 
until a few years ago. 
From 2013, Algeria’s engagement in 
Africa was hampered by Bouteflika’s severe 
health problems, which ended his travel-
ling diplomacy. Yet even before that, the 
Algerian President had shown waning in-
terest in Africa, despite having belonged 
decades ago to the architects of Algeria’s 
early foreign policy and its support for anti-
colonial movements. 
His successor Abdelmadjid Tebboune, 
in office since December 2019, announced 
Algeria’s “return to Africa” at his first AU 
Summit in February 2020. While this is 
probably motivated by a desire not to leave 
the field entirely to Morocco, external secu-
rity challenges also lead Algiers to look 
to the south: instability in Mali, chaos in 
Libya, pressure of migration on its southern 
borders, and the European and US military 
presence in the Sahel. The latter Algiers 
observes with suspicion. 
However a contoured Africa strategy 
comparable to Morocco’s is not currently 
observable. And the prospects of one emerg-
ing are not especially good. Algerian deci-
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sion-makers are preoccupied with signifi-
cant internal and economic challenges – 
for which they have to date been unable to 
present strategies. 
Tunisia Seeking to Catch Up 
Tunisia has been observing Morocco’s 
Africa policy increasingly closely and en-
viously. In ministries and business circles 
one hears that Tunisia could in fact offer 
comparable or better expertise, for example 
in the IT, real estate development, and 
banking sectors, in technical planning of 
major infrastructure projects, and in 
health and education services. 
After a good two decades where Sub-
Saharan Africa played a marginal role, 
Tunisia has been gradually awakening from 
its slumber. Following the removal of the 
Ben Ali regime in 2011 the transitional 
government attempted to revive the African 
diplomatic engagement of the era of Presi-
dent Habib Bourguiba (1957–1987). But 
this was a brief episode of little strategic 
import. For example Tunis was unable to 
prevent the decision of the African Devel-
opment Bank in 2013 to move its head-
quarters back to Abidjan. 
Tunisia has nevertheless incrementally 
expanded its engagement in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as demonstrated by its joining 
ECOWAS in 2017 as an observer, and its 
accession to the Common Market for East-
ern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 2018. 
In 2017 the then prime minister, Youssef 
Chahed, visited Niger, Mali and Burkina 
Faso. The new prime minister appointed in 
autumn 2020, Hichem Mechichi, announced 
that he would step up economic diplomacy 
in Africa. The country’s president, Kaïs 
Saïed, to date has shown only limited inter-
est in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
So far it is the private sector that presses 
hardest for a clearer orientation on Africa, 
first and foremost the Tunisia-Africa Busi-
ness Council (TABC). It establishes contacts, 
organises conferences, and lobbies for the 
legal and administrative reforms required 
to encourage investment and exports. Given 
the fundamental problems of the young 
democracy – slow decision-making, an 
overwhelmed parliament, and a lack of 
political continuity – this is inevitably a 
protracted process. 
Institutional Power Play 
Morocco’s confidence, Algeria’s defence of 
its legacy and Tunisia’s reawakening inter-
est are also reflected within the African 
institutions and organisations. The demise 
of Libyan dictator Qadhafi in 2011 made 
Algeria the unchallenged Maghreb heavy-
weight within the AU. But Morocco 
now contributes at least as much financial-
ly and expects relevant positions and 
influence in AU organs.  
For almost two decades an Algerian has 
held the post of AU Commissioner for Peace 
and Security, who also oversees the AU’s 
Peace and Security Council (PSC). Morocco 
joined the PSC in 2018 and held its rotating 
chair in 2019. Where Rabat is represented 
in AU bodies there is often conflict over 
formulations that (could potentially) relate 
to the Western Sahara conflict, and over 
the presence of the Sahrawi Republic as a 
member of the AU. Although Morocco 
has not to date succeeded in excluding the 
Polisario from the AU, the fronts have 
hardened. Influential countries like South 
Africa maintain their unequivocal backing 
for the Polisario, but thirteen AU members 
explicitly support Morocco’s claim to the 
Western Sahara, having opened consulates 
in the Moroccan-occupied part since 2019. 
Algeria is home to an important AU in-
stitution, the African Centre for the Study 
and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). Morocco 
and Tunisia now have their own too: The 
African Migration Observatory founded in 
2018 is based in Rabat, the AU Institute for 
Statistics in Tunis. In 2020 Morocco also 
achieved a minor victory in relation to Afri-
can representation in the United Nations, 
providing the chair of the UN Human Rights 
Council’s Independent Fact-Finding Mission 
on Libya. Algeria’s candidate for the post of 
UN Special Representative in Libya was ap-
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parently rejected by Washington. This exam-
ple illustrates how influence of the Magh-
reb states in Africa sometimes functions 
obliquely and/or relies on external backing. 
Jostling over Security Alliances 
Negative effects of the Algerian-Moroccan 
rivalry are especially obvious in the secu-
rity domain. Algeria was one of the driving 
forces behind the African Peace and Secu-
rity Architecture (APSA) through its engage-
ment in the AU Peace and Security Council 
and the ACSRT. But despite pressing shared 
security challenges in the Sahel/Sahara 
region, none of the multilateral security ini-
tiatives includes all three Maghreb states – 
apart from loose involvement in Washing-
ton’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Part-
nership. Instead Algeria and Morocco each 
attempt to make their own mark. 
In 2010 Algiers set up a Joint Military 
Staff Committee (CEMOC) in Tamanrasset to 
fight terrorism in the Sahel with Mali, Mau-
ritania and Niger and develop their security 
capacities. Morocco and Tunisia participate 
in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CEN-SAD), which was founded by Qadhafi 
and also has a security dimension. But 
neither CEN-SAD nor CEMOC play a signifi-
cant role in the Sahel. Initiatives also in-
volving international actors, such as the 
G5-Sahel, are more visible. 
Although Algeria has achieved successes 
in the field of conflict resolution, for exam-
ple with the Accord d’Alger for Mali in 2015, 
Morocco has been challenging for that role. 
For example the Libyan Political Agreement 
establishing a UN-supported government 
was signed in Skhirat, Morocco, in 2015. In 
autumn 2020 the Libyan conflict parties 
again negotiated in Morocco, and later in 
Tunisia – despite Algeria repeatedly offer-
ing its services as mediator and enjoying 
the confidence of important conflict parties. 
What we see here yet again is the strong 
strategic and implementation capacity of 
the Moroccan monarchy. Even in Mali, 
where Algeria hoped to rapidly position 
itself as the mediator after the August 2020 
coup, Morocco soon arrived to offer its 
services. 
Tunisia seeks prominence principally 
in peace-keeping. In 2019 the Maghreb’s 
smallest nation participated in five UN 
missions in Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
MINUSMA in Mali. Morocco was involved in 
three missions in 2019, in two cases with 
large contingents. In November 2020 Algeria 
adopted a constitutional amendment per-
mitting its armed forces to participate in 
international peace-keeping operations – 
most of which occur in Africa. This could 
trigger a Maghreb peace-keeping race, with 
potentially positive effects. 
Unequal Economic Competition 
The sector where both Algeria and Tunisia 
have the most catching up to do is the 
economy. Casablanca is by volume the con-
tinent’s largest financial centre and Morocco 
is streets ahead in trade with and invest-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure). 
Between 2005 and 2019 Morocco’s ex-
ports quadrupled and Tunisia’s more than 
doubled. Both have large trade surpluses 
with Sub-Saharan Africa. Algeria on the 
other hand imports considerably more from 
Sub-Saharan Africa than it exports there. Its 
export volume has however been increasing 
noticeably for some years and its imports 
from southern Africa have soared. This in-
dicates growing trade relations with certain 
Sub-Saharan economies. 
The African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) launched in 2019 includes all three 
Maghreb states. It is designed to come into 
effect incrementally, and is initially unlikely 
to alter the imbalance towards Morocco. 
Tunisia and Algeria have no economic strat-
egy for Sub-Saharan Africa (yet). Further 
hurdles are foreign exchange controls and 
the lack of double taxation agreements. 
Algeria also suffers a lack of diversification 
in its export sector and uncompetitive ser-
vices; it remains to be seen whether govern-
ment ideas such as offering services from its 
public construction sector to Sub-Saharan 
Africa states will be implemented and find 
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demand. Tunisia for its part has undertaken 
first concrete steps, such as opening two new 
embassies and four trade offices in Africa. 
Connectivity Is Key 
Both Algeria and Tunisia have recognised 
that Morocco’s economic success in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been boosted by a for-
ward-looking policy of connectivity. In 
response, Tunisia has established new air 
routes to Sub-Saharan Africa and Algeria 
has opened a border crossing to Mauritania. 
Algiers lauded the latter as a step towards 
intensification of cooperation with West 
Africa as a whole. In 2020 Algeria also com-
pleted its section of the Trans-Sahara High-
way, which is planned to eventually reach 
Nigeria; Tunisia is also connected. Whether 
this route – if its Sahel stretch is complet-
ed one day – can become a major transport 
artery will depend crucially on stability and 
security in the Sahel/Sahara region. 
Morocco’s transport connections to Sub-
Saharan Africa are likely to remain un-
rivalled in the longer term, if only by virtue 
of the country’s geographical location. 
Casablanca is far and away the Maghreb’s 
largest flight hub and Tanger Med has estab-
lished itself as Africa’s largest port in terms 
of container shipping volumes, benefitting 
from its location where the Atlantic meets 
the Mediterranean. Sea routes from Algeria 
to Sub-Saharan Africa are long, from Tunisia 
even longer. Tunisia suffers an additional 
disadvantage in that all its land routes pass 
through Libyan or Algerian territory, mak-
ing exports either dangerous or dependent 
on Algerian cooperation. For Tunisia’s 
export capacity to the south it will be vital 
to expand air transport – and its ports, de-
spite the comparatively long sea routes. Yet, 
Moroccan connectivity also has its Achilles 
heel: its only land route to Sub-Saharan 
Africa runs through Western Saharan ter-
ritory, making it vulnerable to conflict 
related blockages or even direct confronta-
tion between Morocco and the Polisario, 
as was the case in November 2020. 
Rivalries also exist in relation to energy 
infrastructure. Plans for a trans-Saharan gas 
pipeline from Nigeria to Algeria have been 
around for decades. An agreement for a 
pipeline from Nigeria via Morocco to Spain 
signed in 2016 appears to have better pros-
pects of realisation. 
The progress of such infrastructure proj-
ects depends not least on support from non-
African states. China is especially prominent 
and is discernibly thinking about trilateral 
cooperation with North and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As such it influences the Maghreb 
competition for the role of “gateway to 
Africa”. To date Algeria has been Beijing’s 
so-called “comprehensive strategic partner” 
in the Maghreb. But more recently China 
has been turning increasingly to Morocco, 
for example as an automotive manufactur-
ing and export base for Africa as a whole. 
Russia, as a traditional partner of Algeria, 
is also showing interest in Morocco for tri-
lateral cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Winning Hearts and Minds 
Tunisian and Algerian attempts to keep up 
with Morocco in the field of soft power are 
still modest, as reflected in their external 
communication. Algeria was unable to capi-
talise strongly on debt relief of – according 
to Algerian announcements – around 
three billion US dollars for fourteen African 
states between 2013 and 2018. By contrast 
Rabat managed to generate international 
visibility for its deliveries of protective equip-
ment “made in Morocco” to Sub-Saharan 
Africa during the first wave of the Covid-19 
pandemic. 
In the substance as well as the represen-
tation, Morocco’s Sub-Sahara strategy also 
pursues a significantly more sophisticated 
approach. First of all, much more research 
on Africa is conducted in Morocco. King 
Hassan II founded an Institute of African 
Studies back in 1987; since then a growing 
number of Moroccan think-tanks have 
sprung up working on Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Morocco’s role there. 
The strategy is also reflected in concrete 
policies. In development policy, for example, 
Rabat has a well-established South-South 
focus encompassing classical development 
aid such as water projects. Algeria is at-
tempting to catch up: in spring 2020 Presi-
dent Tebboune announced the creation of 
a development agency for Africa. The Tuni-
sian Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(ATCT) currently covers Africa with just one 
office in Mauritania, but is increasingly 
drawing on external support for its African 
activities, for example from the German 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen-
arbeit (GIZ) and the Turkish Cooperation 
and Coordination Agency (TİKA). 
Morocco’s education policy is also unri-
valled. In 2019 it hosted more than 17,000 
students from Sub-Saharan Africa, about 
half of whom received Moroccan scholar-
ships. Algeria opened an institute of the 
Pan-African University (PAU) in 2014 with 
German support, although its student num-
bers are relatively small. Comprehensive 
figures for African students in the country 
are not available. In Tunisia the number of 
students from African countries has almost 
halved, from 12,000 (2010) to 6,500 (2018) 
In religious diplomacy, too, Morocco stands 
unchallenged. Rabat trains imams from 
about ten African states and makes fre-
quent use of its Sufi orders to open doors. 
This applies especially to the Tijaniyya, 
which has millions of adherents in West 
Africa. Leaders of the Moroccan Tijaniyya 
have accompanied the king and business 
delegations to Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
when the Moroccan foreign minister visited 
Mali after the coup in 2020 he also met with 
the order’s local leader. While the tomb of 
the founder in Fez, Morocco, has become 
a place of pilgrimage for believers from 
across Sub-Saharan Africa, Algiers has failed 
to generate symbolic capital from his birth-
place in Algeria. 
Last but not least, Morocco has outplayed 
the other Maghreb states with its migration 
policy. Since 2014 it has granted temporary 
residence permits to tens of thousands of 
irregular migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
enabling access to the labour market and 
health and education systems. Even if this 
policy looks more convincing on paper than 
it is on the ground, it has earned Morocco 
goodwill in Sub-Saharan Africa and a better 
look than Algeria and Tunisia. Although 
Tunisia set a milestone in 2018 as the first 
Arab country to pass legislation against 
racism, its measures, like Algeria’s, often 
lack visibility. Morocco simply sells what it 
does better, both at home and abroad. 
The Limits of Africa Policy 
Quite aside from the competition between 
them, the African ambitions of the Maghreb 
states encounter constraints: 
Firstly, the Africa policies of the respec-
tive governments are not supported by 
their societies, which generally look more 
to Europe and the Arab world. Morocco’s 
Africa policy is the king’s hobbyhorse but 
finds little resonance among the political 
parties. Civil society actors complain that 
big business linked to the monarchy profits 
most while trickle-down effects are absent. 
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In Algeria too, indifference towards Sub-
Saharan Africa predominates, with Africa 
policy dependent on a handful of elites from 
the independence movement, some civil 
society actors, and a few visionary entre-
preneurs. Tunisia’s turn to the South is 
propagated primarily by dynamic private-
sector elites. 
At the other end of the equation Magh-
rebi ambitions also encounter resistance 
among the governments and populations of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Widespread racism in 
the Maghreb – brought to light by growing 
migration from Sub-Saharan Africa – plays 
a role. Sub-Saharan Africans frequently 
experience discrimination and violence, in-
cluding at the hands of the authorities. 
Since 2018 Mali and Niger have seen recur-
ring demonstrations against Algeria’s ruth-
less deportation policy. The Maghreb states 
risk acquiring a reputation as the enforcers 
of European policies against irregular 
migration. 
Rabat has experienced the limits of its 
Africa policy since 2017, with the West Afri-
can states denying accession to ECOWAS 
over concerns about Morocco’s economic – 
and general – dominance. Across Sub-
Saharan Africa there are fundamental doubts 
over the willingness of the Maghreb states 
to fully integrate – and be prepared to for-
go special status, for instance in trade rela-
tions with Europe. Only one Moroccan has 
been officially ranked in the pool of can-
didates for the election of new AU Commis-
sioners in 2021 (with little prospect of suc-
cess) and no Algerians or Tunisians have 
pre-qualified. One factor here may be many 
AU members’ reservations about the Magh-
reb states. 
Nevertheless, the Maghreb states are 
likely to profit from the growing desire to 
find African solutions for Africa. In light 
of the shutdowns and transport disruption 
associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, 
voices within Africa are increasingly calling 
for purely continental supply chains to be 
established to reduce dependence on exter-
nal actors. Morocco especially appears deter-
mined to assume a central role and not 
simply leave Sub-Saharan Africa’s attractive 
markets to outside actors like China, Russia, 
Turkey, the Gulf and European states. 
European Union: 
Promote Positive Dynamics 
The EU’s policy towards the Maghreb has to 
date operated principally within the frame-
work of its Neighbourhood and Mediter-
ranean policies. Individual EU states, in-
cluding Germany, also cooperate closely 
with individual Maghreb states. Growing 
interest in Sub-Saharan Africa in both the 
Maghreb and Europe opens up new per-
spectives for all sides. Realising them will 
require German and European economic 
and political actors to conceptualise their 
policies more strongly in terms of the con-
tinent as a whole, and specifically conti-
nental integration. They must not treat the 
Maghreb’s interest in Africa as competing 
with its interest in Europe or with Europe’s 
own interest in Africa. Appropriate starting 
points include the framework of the G20 
Compact with Africa (CwA). 
In the medium term African integration 
could function as the motor for the Magh-
reb integration process that the EU seeks 
to foster, to date unsuccessfully. Successful 
(economic) integration in Africa could also 
function to stabilise the Maghreb, which 
would clearly be in the EU’s interest. 
For the EU, supporting such promising 
developments implies firstly a stronger focus 
on trilateral economic and development 
cooperation. Concretely this could mean 
employing and learning from Maghrebi 
expertise, for example in German and Euro-
pean economic partnerships and develop-
ment projects with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Here the Maghreb can help to build or ex-
pand financial and technological bridges 
between Europe and Africa. 
It is therefore obvious, secondly, for ex-
perienced exporters like Germany to offer 
technical expertise to the two “stragglers” 
on matters such as developing strategies 
and expanding the infrastructure for 
exporting locally produced goods to Africa. 
This would also benefit German and Euro-
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pean manufacturers producing in the 
Maghreb by opening up markets compris-
ing about one billion consumers. A cor-
responding project for Tunisian small 
and medium-sized enterprises is already 
running, with funding from the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Trilateral cooperation can 
also mean jointly creating the precondi-
tions for positioning Tunisia as an IT hub 
and health training centre for Africa; in 
both areas the country is a leader on the con-
tinent. It is also an opportune moment to 
offer Algeria support for exporting goods 
and expertise: Algiers is currently interested 
in export diversification and in rectifying 
its trade deficit with Africa. The govern-
ment stands under great pressure to pro-
duce results. 
Thirdly, European actors must work to 
minimise the potential negative (side-) 
effects of European policies in the Maghreb. 
Migration management must take into con-
sideration the reputation of the Maghreb 
states, which is closely bound up with the 
treatment of migrants from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It must also be ensured that the 
border management policies Europe pushes 
in Africa do not interfere with African inte-
gration. Europe should also take Africa’s 
efforts to develop the AfCFTA seriously: 
negotiations over bilateral free trade agree-
ments with Morocco and Tunisia should 
pay heed to possible consequences for 
African integration. 
Fourthly it is important to counteract 
Maghrebi zero-sum thinking. Rather than 
supporting the Africa policy of either Mo-
rocco or Algeria or Tunisia, the EU should 
support the constructive elements of each. 
This also applies to the Maghreb states’ 
engagement for peace and security in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In relation to the Western 
Sahara Europe should continue to support 
the UN line and not subscribe to unilateral 
French or Spanish initiatives. 
There is a great deal to gain geopolitically 
if Europe establishes itself as a dependable 
supporter of closer relations between North 
and Sub-Saharan Africa and forges ahead 
with triangular cooperation. This would 
slow the growth of openings for other ex-
ternal actors such as China, India, Turkey, 
and the Gulf states and strengthen the 
European-African axis. 
Dr. Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division. 
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